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The Western Balkans: 
deadlock in the EU enlargement process
Marta Szpala
On 9 November the European Commission presented the annual reports 
assessing the progress of the Balkans states in their preparations for EU 
membership, the enlargement strategy up to autumn 2011, and the asses-
sment of the EU membership applications submitted by Albania and Ma-
cedonia. All these documents show that the reform process in the Balkan 
states has slowed down in comparison to previous years. The main reason 
for this slowdown is the negative consequences of the global economic 
crisis for these countries. Nonetheless, the transformation process is con-
tinuing, despite these difficulties.
Another increasingly serious challenge for integrating the Balkan states is 
the EU's growing reluctance to enlarge any further. Among other measures, 
the EU states have blocked the formal acknowledgement of the integration 
progress (objections have been raised to the submission of membership 
applications by Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, and to granting Albania 
candidate status), which has significantly prolonged the accession process. 
In fact, this illustrates the lack of political will to accept new members.
The European Commission is aware that the integration process may 
be blocked, and so in the coming year it is planning to focus on fostering 
the idea of enlargement among the EU member states. It will also focus 
on persuading the Balkan states to move on with reforms, especially those 
designed to strengthen state institutions (administration, the judiciary), even 
if their progress will not be formally considered during the integration process. 
The Commission assumes that by the end of next year, the reforms imple-
mented by the Balkan states will be comprehensive enough to persuade the 
EU states to step up the integration process in subsequent years. However, 
if the EU member states' standpoint on the enlargement process does not 
change, the Commission's efforts will not bring about the expected results.
Considering that their prospects for EU membership are receding, the Balkan 
states may not have sufficient motivation to go on with long-term reform ef-
forts. As a result, the transformation process may become impeded, and in the 
longer perspective, the situation in the entire region may be destabilised.



















































































the	 level	 of	 mistrust	 within	 the	 EU,	 and	
also	 with	 regard	 to	 potential	 candidates.	
Economic	difficulties	 in	 the	EU	have	also	
led	some	Western	European	political	elites	




























states’	 domestic	 arenas.	 Similar	 tendencies	 can	 be	 perceived	 in	 other	 processes	 aimed	
at	 integrating	 the	Balkan	states	with	 the	EU	zone,	such	as	 the	 liberalisation	of	 the	visa	
regime	and	the	implementation	of	the	Stabilisation	and	Association	Agreements	(SAA)	and	
interim	trade	agreements7.	Moreover,	when	the	Balkan	states	meet	all	the	criteria	needed	
The EU's internal problems 
(the economic crisis, implementing 
the Lisbon Treaty), as well as its reluc-
tance to enlarge deriving from both 
the political elites and the public, 
have resulted in making the enlargement 
policy even less significant.





























































for	 the	 first	 time	highlighted	 the	benefits	





tal	 transformation	 and	 will	 cease	 to	 be	
a	 source	 of	 threats,	 and	 that	 the	 acces-
sion	 of	 the	Western	Balkans	will	 put	 an	



















The EU institutions' main objectives 
in the coming year will be to enhance 
the image of the enlargement policy 
among the member states and to step 
up reforms in the Balkans, even if their 
progress in the enlargement process  
is not formally noted (for example, 
without starting negotiations 
or granting candidate status).









































and	 disputes	 between	 individual	 states	
(Greece/Macedonia,	 Croatia/Slovenia,	




the	Balkan	 states	 face,	 it	 can	 hardly	 be	
expected	 that	 they	 will	 make	 quick	 and	





















The governments of the Balkan 
states may face increasing difficulties 
convincing their respective public 
opinions that further transformation 
efforts need to be made on their route 
to the EU, if the EU itself fails to give 
them more incentives. The perspec-
tive of membership itself, which is 
growing more distant if not less likely, 
will be too weak an incentive.






















bership,	 but	 first	 of	 all	 the	 stabilisation	 of	
the	entire	region.	In	the	longer	perspective,	
the	member	states'	lack	of	political	will	to	con-
tinue	 the	 enlargement	 process	 may	 elevate	
nationalist	groups	to	power	which	could	pose	
a	threat	to	the	fragile	order	in	this	region.
For	 the	Western	Balkan	states	 (except	 for	
Croatia),	the	processes	taking	place	in	the	

















Within the coming year, the EU is 
likely to be preoccupied mainly 
with its own internal problems, 
and the tendency to slow down the en- 
largement process may be reinforced. 
Two other reasons for this slowdown 
may be a relatively stable situation 
in the Balkans, which would not force 
the EU to make active efforts in the 
region, and the EU's conviction that 
the Balkan states have no alternative 
but to further integrate with Europe. 
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The Centre for Eastern Studies (CES)	was	established	in	1990.	CES	is	financed	from	the	budget.	
The	Centre	monitors	and	analyses	the	political,	economic	and	social	situation	in	Russia,	Central	
and	Eastern	European	countries,	the	Balkans,	the	Caucasus	and	the	Central	Asia.	
CES focuses	 on	 the	 key	 political,	 economic	 and	 security	 issues,	 such	 as	 internal	 situations	
and	 stability	 of	 the	 mentioned	 countries,	 the	 systems	 of	 power,	 relations	 between	 political	
centres,	foreign	policies,	issues	related	to	NATO	and	EU	enlargement,	energy	supply	security,	
existing	and	potential	conflicts,	among	other	issues.	
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities. 




























*	Based	on	Enlargement Strategy and Progress Reports 2010,	http://ec.europa.eu













Albania 3.2 +3.3% 6.9% no	data 13.5% 3837**
Bosnia &  
Herzegovina
3.8 -3.2% 5.0% 43.0%* 41.5%* 4365**
Croatia 4.5 -5.8% 3.9% 69.0%* 9.4%* 15284**
Montenegro 0.6 -5.3% 3.5% no	data 20.4% 6633**
Kosovo 2.1 +2.9% b.d. 20.5%* 45.4% 2984**
Macedonia 2.1 -0.7% 2.8% 63.8%* 43.3% 4546**
Serbia 7.3 -3.0% 4.1% 29.0%* 16.1%* 5821**
Unless otherwise stated, the data has been provided by the respective countries' statistical offices or central banks.
* Source: Unicredit; ** Source: International Monetary Fund
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